The Art of COIN:
Understanding the Effect of External Support Party Size on Counterinsurgency

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Executive Summary

The nature of conflict within the international system has transformed. Conflict is now characterized by intrastate rather than interstate warfare. Given this escalating trend, this study attempts to contribute to the policy debate by analyzing conditions that affect the outcome of counterinsurgency (COIN). Using data from the RAND study, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency*, this report quantitatively tests for a relationship between the size of the external support party and the success of a COIN campaign. This study finds that there is no relationship between the external support party size and the outcome of a COIN operation.

Introduction

The face of war has changed. Once dominated by conventional warfare between two or more states, conflict is now characterized by intrastate warfare.\(^1\) Although insurgency is a longstanding phenomenon of political unrest with over 300 insurgencies fought since the 1800s\(^2\), modern insurgency is considered to begin with the Chinese Communist insurgency of the 1920s.\(^3\) It is not until after the Cold War, however, that intrastate war experienced the greatest growth. According to Bennett (2015) “…the zero-sum Cold War tactics, including mutually assured destruction, actually encouraged peace between states to ensure survival in the age of nuclear destruction.”\(^4\) As interstate conflict dwindled as a by-product

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1 See Appendix A, Chart B.
of an evolved international system, internal conflict increased. Major global powers that were once engaged in interstate wars are now more likely to participate in internal conflicts as external actors (i.e. third party interveners). An outpouring of weapons from the Eastern bloc gives insurgents upgraded firepower, allowing them to more effectively challenge governments, particularly weak states in which these arms go further in leveling the playing field.

According to the Council on Foreign Relation’s *Invisible Armies* Insurgency Tracker, up through 2012 there were 72 ongoing insurgencies within 45 different countries. A majority of these insurgencies occur in Asia, though a significant number also occur within the Middle East/North Africa and greater continental Africa. With a swell in insurgent activity comes a necessary adaptation of government response that is tailored to reflect the irregular threat; counterinsurgency (COIN). In recent history, the infamy of COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has highlighted the necessity to better understand best practices in COIN. Scholars, policy analysts, and military planners alike have dedicated vast amounts of resources to analyzing successful and unsuccessful historical operations in order to better inform future undertakings. Such analyses have focused on a multitude of conditions that cause or effect insurgency onset, termination, escalation/de-escalation, severity, duration, and outcome. These analyses resulted in

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popular COIN practices like ‘hearts and minds’ and the ‘strong arm approach’\textsuperscript{9}, and lead to the United States Army’s 2006 publication of Field Manual 3-24, which is the first field manual dedicated to counterinsurgency in 20 years.\textsuperscript{10}

Despite the plethora of attention dedicated to COIN, there is still much to be learned, re-evaluated, and adjusted as the nature of the threat evolves. One fundamental question has yet to be asked; is it more effective to support a COIN force as a coalition or a single state? For every counterinsurgency with external support that succeeded or failed, was the number of external support actors a contributing or decisive condition?

This study is attempting to further the academic and policy understanding of what contributes to the outcome of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Specifically, this study evaluated whether the size of the external support (i.e. third party intervention) on behalf of COIN impacts the likelihood of a successful COIN operation. Drawing upon data produced in the RAND study, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers* by Paul, Clarke, & Grill (2010),\textsuperscript{11} this study quantitatively tested for a relationship between the size (number of actors) of the intervening party and the success of a COIN operation. After quantitatively testing the size of an external support party as a single, small, and large collective for a relationship with a COIN win\textsuperscript{12}, this study finds that no such relationship exists. Therefore, it can be concluded that the size of an external support party will not positively or negatively impact the outcome of a COIN operation. This finding is a critical addition to

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\textsuperscript{12} COIN ‘win’ is defined as a counterinsurgent operation in which the COIN forces prevailed over the insurgent opposition forces.
the conventional wisdom on modern counterinsurgency practices because it allows for greater flexibility in strategic planning of COIN campaigns.

This study begins with an overview of the definitions and nature of both the insurgency and counterinsurgency phenomena. Next, this study reviews the methodology, report on the findings, and discuss the limitations of this study. Finally, this study will conclude with a discussion on the policy implications of the findings as it applies to current and future COIN operations.

**Literature Review**

According to the *United States Armed Forces Joint Publication* from 2013, “Insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region.”

Put differently, insurgency is a form of irregular warfare that uses force to achieve political change, whether ‘change’ is reform, revolution, resistance, succession or nullification. There are many factors that can cause or contribute to an insurgency. Chart A, below, describes the three conditions that lead to insurgency: opportunity, motive and means.

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14 While both terrorism and guerilla warfare can be methods of insurgency, the three terms are not interchangeable. For a discussion on the difference between these three terms, see: Kiras, James. 2016. *Irregular Warfare: Terrorism And Insurgency*. PDF. 1st ed. Accessed May 7. http://www.indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/baylis3e_ch09.pdf.
15 Joint Chiefs of Staff,. 2013. Counterinsurgency. Department of Defense. X.
Due to the power asymmetry between the insurgents and government, insurgents must resort to using, and actively force their advisory to use, methods and tactics other than that of conventional force. Beckett (2005) describes common characteristics of insurgent activity:

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Features of insurgency that have remained constant over the centuries have been the tendency for insurgent groups to operate in difficult terrain – mountain, desert, forest, swamp, and jungle – of which they often possessed local knowledge denied their opponents. Moreover, they often enjoyed a degree of popular support among local inhabitants. They were generally more mobile than their opponents and would undertake hit and run raids that enabled them to inflict damage, yet also to evade their opponent and to prolong the struggle.  

Governments and the external actor(s) supporting them face tremendous difficulty in addressing an insurgent threat. The threat of insurgent movements extends beyond successful campaigns for political change. Such threats include “…the destabilization of regions, resource flows, and markets; the blossoming of transnational crime; humanitarian disasters; transnational terrorism; and so forth.” David Kilcullen, a Chief Strategist in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the U.S. Department of State, describes the convoluted setting surrounding insurgencies as a “conflict ecosystem” (see Appendix A, Chart D) that interweaves complex social, informational, and physical environments. This struggle to dismantle an insurgency and address all of its moving parts is called counterinsurgency (COIN). As defined by the U.S. Military, “Counterinsurgency is a comprehensive civilian and military effort designed to simultaneously defeat and contain...
insurgency and address its root causes.\textsuperscript{20} Like insurgents that fight for legitimacy sourced from the local populace\textsuperscript{21}, the end goal of counterinsurgency is to restore or ensure a government’s legitimate political control within its borders.\textsuperscript{22} An insurgency only concludes when the insurgents achieve a victory, the government (COIN forces) achieves a victory, or the two sides negotiate a settlement.\textsuperscript{23}

How to best conduct a successful COIN operation is a highly debated and continuously progressing subject. Early COIN theorists, such as Robert Thompson and David Galula, popularized the population-centric ‘classic school’ of counterinsurgency (also known as ‘hearts and minds’).\textsuperscript{24} In 1967, Thompson\textsuperscript{25} established five principles of successful COIN practices; “counter-insurgency operations need to have a clear political aim, operate within the law, possess an overall plan, give priority to dealing with the subversion and create government base areas from which to operate.”\textsuperscript{26} A major turning point in modern counterinsurgency doctrine arose from the experiences of the U.S. military in Iraq. In 2006, General David Petraeus along with other advisors created Field Manual (FM) 3-24 (also called the ‘Petraeus doctrine’\textsuperscript{27}), the military’s first update on counterinsurgency in 20 years.\textsuperscript{28} FM 3-24 “...stresses the need to protect civilian populations, eliminate insurgent leaders and infrastructure, and help establish a legitimate

\textsuperscript{20} Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Chiefs of Staff., 2013. \textit{Counterinsurgency}. Department of Defense. ix.
\textsuperscript{22} Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Chiefs of Staff., 2013. \textit{Counterinsurgency}. Department of Defense. III-1.
\textsuperscript{23} Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Chiefs of Staff., 2013. \textit{Counterinsurgency}. Department of Defense. xi.
and accountable host-nation government able to deliver essential human services.”

This doctrine now guides U.S. action in Afghanistan.

Other academic studies and military analyses have debated the viability of the ‘hearts and minds’ approach (Egnell 2010, Katagiri 2011), observed the effectiveness of targeting militant leadership (Johnston 2012), analyzed the relevance of border conditions and control (Galula and Bowie 1964), contemplated the factors that impact counterinsurgency campaign duration (Johnston and Urlacher 2012), evaluated the impact of mechanized forces on insurgency outcome (Lyall and Wilson 2009), and discussed escalating violence against minorities induced by interventions (Grigoryan 2010).

In 2010, RAND contributed a major study on 30 of the most recently resolved insurgencies. Pulling from existing literature and historical analysis to identify 20 approaches to COIN, RAND authors Paul, Clarke, & Grill (2010) conclude that there are 14 approaches that show support for a successful COIN operation. These 14 approaches include development, pacification, legitimacy, democracy, cost-benefit, border control, accountability, and human services.”


strategic communication, COIN FM (Field Manual 3-24), “beat cop”, “boots on the ground”, tangible support reduction, criticality of intelligence, flexibility and adaptability, and continuation and contestation.\textsuperscript{37} Paul, Clarke, & Grill (2010) note that:

> While we were unable to discern any single most important COIN practice, the data suggests that good practices occur together (along with success) with such regularity that we cannot even rank their importance. Victory, it appears, does indeed have a thousand fathers—a substantial collection of effective practices and a host of complementary and mutually reinforcing lines of operation is what wins the day in COIN.\textsuperscript{38}

What the academic, policy, and military communities currently know about counterinsurgency is extensive but not comprehensive. As demonstrated, much of the conventional wisdom is focused on which operational practices lead to success. While these existing studies on ‘best practices’ are undoubtedly useful, they skip over the primary consideration of many policy makers when faced with the option for participation in conflicts abroad: \textit{should we get involved}? One yet to be observed area that addresses this fundamental question is within the effects of external support on COIN operations. As the world shrinks from globalization, internal conflicts are becoming increasingly externalized through the participation of foreign states. Moreover, as internal conflicts are on the rise,\textsuperscript{38}


so are the occurrences of external support. Therefore, understanding of the effects of external support is a principal component to policy and military planning.

While external support has been the focus of several studies, such as Regan’s (2002)\(^{39}\) study on third-party intervention (i.e. external support) and civil war duration, Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce’s (2008)\(^{40}\) study on third-party intervention and civil war process, and Vernetti’s (2009)\(^{41}\) study on the value of external support of COIN, the existing scholarship has yet to consider the full range of conditions of an external support party as it may impact the outcome of a COIN operation. This study will take a step toward closing the gap by focusing on one condition in particular: quantity. Specifically, it will evaluate whether the number of the external support actors increases, decreases, or has no effect on the likelihood of a COIN victory.

**Analysis**

While previous studies have thoroughly evaluated ‘good vs. bad’ counterinsurgency practices, few studies have looked at how the nature of the intervening party impacts the outcome of a COIN operation. In an effort to help inform contemporary COIN policy, this study aims to fill the gap in the literature and provide conclusive findings that will shed new light on conditions that contribute to successful COIN operations.

**Methodology**

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The cases and empirical data for this study come from the RAND publication, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency* by Paul, Clarke, & Grill (2010). RAND’s study compiled detailed case studies for 30 insurgencies that started and ended between 1978 and 2008. From this list, I further limited the cases to insurgencies in which the COIN force (government) received external support. The measure of external support is taken from RAND’s variable, *external support to COIN from a strong state or military.* In the end, this study retained 21 conflicts that are divided into measurable conflict phases, which ultimately provided this study with 45 cases for analysis.

The dependent variable, *COIN win,* measures conflict outcome in which the government obtained a decisive victory; any conflicts with a mixed outcome, even those favoring the government, is considered a COIN loss. The independent variable, *external support party size,* is a new variable coded based upon the information conveyed within the detailed case studies by RAND and supplemented through further open source research (see Appendix B for list of external support parties by phase and sources used for data collection). Note that ‘size’ refers to the number of actors involved in providing external support to COIN and not the number of combined troop contributions by these actors. The independent variable was measured three ways to test for all avenues of

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statistical significance; external support constitutes a single party (1 state); external support constitutes a small collective (2-4 states); and external support constitutes a large collective (5+ states).

From the 20 approaches to COIN listed in Paul, Clarke, & Grill’s (2010) study, I utilized the 14 COIN approaches that their study concluded to have either “strong support” or “some support” for COIN success as this study’s control variables. I then chose one measure (as many of the approaches had multiple measures) to represent each of the 14 aforementioned approaches (see Appendix B for full list of variables). While some of these measures overlapped for different approaches within the RAND study, I ensured that no two measures are repeated for multiple approaches. In addition, I added the controls repression, resource wealth, and ethnically or religiously motivated violence (all similarly taken from data recorded in RAND’s study). While these factors are not specifically COIN practices and are therefore excluded from RAND’s list of 14 ‘best practices,’ all three are still conflict conditions that potentially hold explanatory power.

Findings

When testing for a relationship between external support party size (measured three ways—single, small and large) and COIN win, and when controlling for all previously established successful COIN practices, the empirical data shows that the size of the external support party will not impact the likelihood of a successful COIN operation. When testing for a relationship between the dependent and independent variables with the addition of repression, resource wealth, and ethnically or religiously motivated violence, external
support party size still did not hold explanatory power for operational success. In fact, any combination of controls did not produce statistical significance for the independent variable. Notably, the lack of relationship went both ways; the study revealed that the external support party size was neither positively nor negatively correlated with COIN win.

*Study Limitations*

The predictive probability of my findings is limited by a few factors. First, as with any study, there is a certain margin of error—quantitative analysis will never perfectly predict a relationship. Quantitative analysis is meant to find trends with a certain level of confidence. Because some error always occurs, it becomes a matter of how much.

This leads to the second limitation; this study suffers from using quantitative techniques for a relatively small-N study. Quantitative analysis works best on large-N studies, and the statistical software (R) struggled to find statistical significance when there were a multitude of controls and so few cases. While the results may change as time moves forward and new conflicts populate the dataset, at the present time there are simply not enough instances of resolved conflicts with third party intervention on behalf of a COIN force for a large-N study to produce results with a greater predictive probability. However, it is necessary to note that even taking all controls out of the analysis did not result in a statistically significance relationship. Therefore, while a lack of cases reduces the predictive probability of this study, it is not inaccurately producing a relationship when there is none or only a negligible correlation.

Third, how I chose to represent each variable is another possible influence on the presence of a relationship between *COIN win* and *external support party size*. As noted
above and further discussed in Appendix B, the data in RAND’s study provided multiple measures for each “good COIN practice” approach. From these multiple measures I chose just one—had I chosen a different measure, the results may vary.

**Policy Implications**

The results of this study undoubtedly furthers the policy debate by extending the range of understanding of what does and does not have a noteworthy impact on modern counterinsurgency practices. Finding that two conditions have no relationship is just as significant in informing policy as determining the existence of a positively or negatively correlated relationship. In the case of this study, the conditions being tested are COIN win and external support party size and the finding is that counterinsurgency success is not effected by the number of actors involved in third party intervention.

This finding provides states with greater flexibility in the strategic planning of COIN campaigns. Currently, effectiveness is publically cited as one of the primary concerns for states when debating whether or not to intervene into an internal conflict. Not all states agree on what determines effectiveness, and this friction could impede a COIN campaign. However, this study has unveiled one mitigating factor by determining that effectiveness is not impacted by party size.

While effectiveness will still be a major consideration by the one or more participating external support parties, because the number of parties involved in a coalition is not a predictor of success and thus not a factor of effectiveness, states are now free to adopt policies in support or opposition of coalitions based on other factors. Such factors include (but are not limited to) cost-sharing, desired degrees of control, regional or
international political concerns, and/or domestic pressures. Although not a comprehensive solution to combatting insurgencies, the conclusions from this empirical inquiry contribute to effectual counterinsurgency by bridging the knowledge gap and providing policy makers with a better foundation for informed decision making.
Appendix A: Charts and Figures

Chart B, Armed Conflict by Type

Chart C, Traditional vs. Irregular Warfare

Chart D, The Conflict Ecosystem


Appendix B: Additional Information on Methodology

All cases used within this study originated from *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency* by Paul, C., Clarke, C., & Grill, B. (2010).

**Case selection criteria:**

- *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers* case selection criteria\(^{47}\)
  - They involved fighting between states and non-states seeking to take control of a government or region or that used violence to change government policies.
  - The conflict killed at least 1,000 people over its course, with a yearly average of at least 100.
  - At least 100 people were killed on both sides (including civilians attacked by rebels).
  - They were not coups, countercoups, or insurrections.
- Involves external support on behalf of the host nation’s government
- Insurgency onset and termination occurred between 1978 and 2008.

This study has 45 cases derived from 21 conflicts that were split into conflict phases. Each conflicts was split into phases and assessed for COIN attributes by phase because “…the approach and behavior of the COIN force, the actions of insurgents, and other

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important conditions can all change during the course of an insurgency…”

Cases used:

1. Nicaragua
2. Sudan (SPLA)
3. Papua New Guinea
4. Liberia
5. RWANDA
6. Moldova
7. Sierra Leone
8. Algeria
9. Croatia
10. Georgia/Abkhazia
11. Nagorno-Karabakh
12. Bosnia
13. Burundi
14. Afghanistan (Taliban)
15. Nepal
16. DRC
17. Afghanistan (anti-Soviet)
18. Kampuchea
19. El Salvador
20. Somalia
21. Tajikistan

Variables

All variables within this dataset are bivariate. The dependent variable is the success or failure of a COIN operation. Success or ‘COIN win’ is coded (1) and failure coded (0).

For this study, I coded the independent variable, external support party size, based on the detailed case study reports from RAND’s supplemental publication, Victory has a thousand fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies, and additional sources as needed.

1. External support constitutes a single party: (1) is coded (1) for cases where external support is a single and (0) for cases where it is not.

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49 For further detail on how this variable was constructed, see: Paul, Christopher, Colin P. Clark, and Beth Grill. Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency. RAND. 2010. http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG964.html. 8.
2. External support constitutes a small collective (2-4 states): is coded (1) for cases where external support is a small collective and (0) for cases where it is not.

3. External support constitutes a large collective (5+ states): is coded (1) for cases where external support is a large collective and (0) for cases where it is not.

In an attempt to cover all grounds, this study also measured party size by grouping all cases into one of two categories (instead of one of three categories, as done above)

4. External Support party size: is coded 1=single state, 0= 2 or more states

In the instances where additional sources were used to supplement unclear or missing information from the RAND case studies, the source is listed below:

- **Nicaragua (contras)**
  - External Support: USA
    - [https://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/timeline-nicaragua.php](https://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/timeline-nicaragua.php)

- **Sudan (SPLA)**
  - External Support: Iran, China
    - [http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/sudan.htm](http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/sudan.htm)

- **Papau New Guinea**
  - Eternal support: Australia

- **Liberia**
- External Support: ECOWAS, UN

**RWANDA**

- External Support: phase 1: France and Zaire, phase 2: France, Belgium

  UNAMIR, phase 3: UNAMIR, France stopped providing troops,


- Moldova

  - External Support: Romania

- Sierra Leone

  - External Support: British, ECOMOG, UN

- Algeria

  - External support: In phase 2--France, in Phase 3--France and US


- Croatia

  - External Support: US

- Georgia/Abkhazia

  - External Support: Russia

- Nagorno-Karabakh

  - External Support: Russia provided “…military aid and [additional] provisions [came] from Iran, Israel, Turkey, and numerous Arab states”

**Bosnia**

- External Support: NATO, UNPROFOR (aid was provided in phase 2, but concrete military support did not occur until phase 3).

  - [http://www.britannica.com/event/Bosnian-conflict](http://www.britannica.com/event/Bosnian-conflict)

**Brundi**

- External Support: phase 1--France, Egypt, Russia, China, North Korea, and the United States. (vhatf), phase 2-- the DRC (vhatf), phase 3-- African Union


**Afghanistan (Taliban)**

- External Support: phase 1--Pakistan, UAE, Saudi Arabia, phase 2-- (same), phase 3-- (same)

**Nepal**

- External Support: US, India, china (see Nepal external support pdf)

**DRC**

- External Support: in all phases--Angolan, Zimbabwean, and Namibian forces,

**Afghanistan (anti-soviet)**

- External Support: Soviets

**Kampuchea**

- External support: Vietnam

**El Salvador**
- External Support: US
  - Somalia
    - External Support: US (phase 1)
  - Tajikistan
    - External Support: Primarily Russia in all phases with some assistance by Uzbekistan in phase 1, and minimal assistance from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in phase 2

From the 20 listed approaches in *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers*, 14 of them were considered to have “strong support” or “some support” for a successful COIN operation. These 14 variables are used as controls because their determination as ‘good’ approaches to COIN mean they hold some level of explanatory power that may impact the relationship being testing if not properly controlled for within the analysis. While some of these variables overlapped for different approaches within *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers*, I made sure that I selected one variable for each approach and that no two variables are repeated for multiple approaches.

In addition to the controls derived from the 14 ‘good’ approaches, I included repression, resource wealth, and ethnically or religiously motivated violence. Repression was included as control variable because Paul, Clarke, & Grill (2010) found that repression was positively correlated with conflict phases, and although it did not hold explanatory for
overall conflict outcome, this study uses conflict phases as its unit of analysis and therefore becomes an explanatory variable.\textsuperscript{51}

**Full Variables List**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Type</th>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Variable Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Develop</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Short-term investments,</td>
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<td>Improvements in</td>
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<td>infrastructure/development, or</td>
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<td>property reform in area of conflict</td>
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<td>controlled or claimed by COIN</td>
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<td>force</td>
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<td>Control</td>
<td>Pacify</td>
<td>Pacification</td>
<td>Perception of security created or</td>
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<td>maintained among population in</td>
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<td>areas COIN force claimed to control</td>
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<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Legit</td>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Majority of citizens in area of</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>conflict viewed government as</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>legitimate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Democ</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Free and fair elections held</td>
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<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Rep_use</td>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>Government respected human rights</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and allowed free press</td>
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<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Cost_Ben</td>
<td>Cost-Benefit</td>
<td>COIN force efforts resulted in</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>increased costs for insurgents</td>
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<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Tan_Sup</td>
<td>Tangible Support Reduction</td>
<td>COIN force effectively disrupted</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>insurgent recruiting</td>
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<tr>
<th>Control</th>
<th>COIN_FM</th>
<th>COIN FM</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Beat_cop</td>
<td>&quot;beat cop&quot;</td>
<td>COIN force employed local militias or irregular forces or engaged in/enabled community policing in areas it controlled or claimed to control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Border</td>
<td>Border Control</td>
<td>Flow of cross-border insurgent support significantly decreased in this phase or remained dramatically reduced or absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Strat_Comm</td>
<td>Strategic Communication</td>
<td>Unity of effort/unity of command maintained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Boots</td>
<td>&quot;Boots on the Ground&quot;</td>
<td>COIN force sought to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Intel</td>
<td>Criticality of Intelligence</td>
<td>Intelligence adequate to allow COIN force to disrupt insurgent processes or operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Flex_Adapt</td>
<td>Flexibility and Adaptability</td>
<td>COIN force failed to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Contin_Contest</td>
<td>Continuation and Contestation</td>
<td>Insurgents made critical strategic errors, failed to make obvious adaptations, or voluntarily exited the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Ethno_Relig</td>
<td>Ethnic or Religious</td>
<td>COIN or insurgent actions precipitated (or constituted) ethnic or religious violence</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Resource</td>
<td>Resource Wealth</td>
<td>Expropriable cash crops or mineral wealth in area of conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>Control (excluded from analysis)</td>
<td>Exsup_COIN</td>
<td>External support to COIN occurred during decisive phase of case</td>
<td>External support to COIN occurred during decisive phase of case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control (excluded from analysis)</td>
<td>Exsup_COINwin</td>
<td>External support to COIN occurred during decisive phase of a COIN win case</td>
<td>External support to COIN occurred during decisive phase of a COIN win case</td>
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<tr>
<td>Control (excluded from analysis)</td>
<td>Exsup_InsurgWin</td>
<td>External support to COIN occurred during decisive phase of an INSURGENT win case</td>
<td>External support to COIN occurred during decisive phase of an INSURGENT win case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control (excluded from analysis)</td>
<td>Insurg_win</td>
<td>Insurgent win</td>
<td>Insurgent win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control (excluded from analysis)</td>
<td>Mix_win</td>
<td>Mixed outcome</td>
<td>Mixed outcome</td>
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<tr>
<td>Control (excluded from analysis)</td>
<td>Overall_COINwin</td>
<td>overall COIN win (by all phases)</td>
<td>overall COIN win (by all phases)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variable 1</td>
<td>Exsup_single</td>
<td>Single Party</td>
<td>External support to COIN forces is a single party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent Variable 2</td>
<td>Exsup_small</td>
<td>Small Collective</td>
<td>External support to COIN forces is a small collective party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variable 3</td>
<td>Exsup_large</td>
<td>Large Collective</td>
<td>External support to COIN forces is a large collective party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable</td>
<td>COIN_win</td>
<td>COIN forces win</td>
<td>COIN forces win</td>
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